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SPLITTING THE UPRIGHTS: HOW THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT'S AMERICAN NEEDLE HOLDING
CREATED A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXEMPTED
THE NFL FROM ANTITRUST SCRUTINY,
AND WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
OVERTURN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Derek Taylor*
INTRODUCTION
"'[American Needle] could easily turn out to be the most significant
sports law decision ever."
-Dean Gary Roberts
"'[T]he notion of concerted action liability in the field of profes-
sional sports is at best confusing.'" 2
-Judge Michael S. Kanne
Against a convoluted backdrop, I will attempt, as many courts have
before me, to analyze the perplexing, potentially groundbreaking sin-
gle entity issue. Recently, the Seventh Circuit held in American Nee-
dle v. NFL that the National Football League's (NFL) thirty-two
teams acted as a single entity when they banded together to collec-
tively license intellectual property rights to merchandisers. 3 When de-
ciding whether the NFL's conduct was subject to Sherman Act Section
* Derek Taylor works as an attorney in Dallas, Texas, practicing civil litigation. Derek was
born and raised in Texas, where he attended Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas and
received a Bachelor of Business Administration in Finance, cum laude, and a Bachelor of Arts in
Philosophy with Departmental Distinction, cum laude, in 2006. He received his Juris Doctorate,
cum laude, from Southern Methodist University in 2009. Derek also attended Marquette Uni-
versity Law School through the National Sports Law Institute's Exchange Program, where he
received the Sports Law Certificate in 2009. Derek would like to thank Marquette Law Profes-
sors Matt Mitten and Paul Anderson and SMU Law Professor C. Paul Rogers for their guidance.
Derek would like to thank his parents for supporting his sports-driven life. He would also like to
thank Matthew Tiesling for providing substantive paper edits and life guidance.
1. Lester Munson, Antitrust Case could be Armageddon, ESPN.com, July 17, 2009, http://
sports.espn.go.comlespn/columns/story?columnist=munsonlester&id=4336261 (author quoting
Dean Roberts from an interview).
2. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Super
Silky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir. 1999).
3. Id. at 744.
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One or Section Two, the Seventh Circuit could have defined the con-
duct to be one of three types along a continuum, either that of (1) a
single entity, (2) a joint venture, or (3) an agreement.4 Rather than
characterize the teams' conduct as an agreement or joint venture, the
Seventh Circuit said the NFL teams acted as a single unit through the
NFL, which means Section One does not apply.5 The Seventh Cir-
cuit's holding creates a circuit split, as several circuit courts have held
that sports leagues are not single entities and a recent Second Circuit
opinion applied the rule of reason to MLB's collective licensing of
intellectual property.6 As the paper will show, because of the circuit
split and the effect of the Seventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court, after recently granting certiorari in American Needle,7 should
now overturn it. Even if the Court does not overturn the Seventh
Circuit, Congress may soon retrench by making the NFL subject to
antitrust scrutiny even for television licensing by revoking the federal
statute it enacted in 1961. California Representative Maxine Waters
recently told NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell that it is now time
for "Congress to take a look at your antitrust exemption," saying she
believes it should be removed.8
The United States' legal structure is similar to the NFL's or any
other major sports league's structure. The NFL's head office creates
rules for all teams and players to follow. Congress similarly creates
rules for states and citizens to follow. Federal courts then enforce the
rules when citizens break them. NFL referees apply the NFL rules
when deciding whether to penalize a team or player, or allow play to
continue. If courts misapply the law or inconsistently apply the law so
as to create a circuit split, the Supreme Court occasionally weighs in to
resolve the ambiguity in the law by looking to Congress' legislative
4. As discussed later, Judge Easterbrook's 1996 Chicago Bulls decision expressed the contin-
uum of conduct. Chi. Prof'I Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996). The
continuum might look like the following:
SINGLE ENTITY JOINT VENTURE HORIZONTAL
AGREEMENT
Section Two applies Section One Section One
Rule of Reason Per Se or
Applies Rule of Reason
Applies
5. Id.
6. See MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 332 (2nd Cir. 2008).
7. Associated Press, Supreme Court to Hear Antitrust Case, ESPN.com, June 29, 2009, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4294204.
8. Associated Press, Covyers Wants Review of All Data, ESPN.com, Oct. 28, 2009, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4601966.
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intent. Similarly, the head official or NFL rulemaking committee, with
guidance from the NFL's intent, sometimes clarifies an ambiguous
field of play rule for teams to follow and referees to enforce. Con-
gress enacted the Sherman Act to protect economic competition for
consumers' benefit. The NFL, too, designed playing rules to benefit
its consumers - football fans. But what happens when NFL referees
make calls that simply are not in the NFL rulebook?
For instance, suppose the NFL playing rules do not prohibit a cer-
tain action. A select group of referees, however, start penalizing that
action each time they see it. Even though the NFL writes rules to
prohibit all actions it believes will harm the game of football or foot-
ball players, one group of referees continues to penalize an unwritten
action. Other referees, however, do not penalize the action because
the NFL rules do not prohibit that action. They believe that the only
prohibited conduct is that conduct the NFL expressly disallows in the
NFL Rules. And until the NFL writes a rule to prohibit that conduct,
not only is it legal, but players and teams should engage in that con-
duct when it will benefit the team. Meanwhile, the head of the officiat-
ing committee recognizes the refereeing split, but refuses to address it
and instead allows the two groups of referees to call games differently.
Fans, teams, and players are all outraged because the refereeing split
creates two sets of rules and compromises the integrity of the game.
Recent court decisions have created a similar split in the sports
leagues' collective licensing context. Sports leagues-like the NFL-
create collective agencies to sell individual team's intellectual prop-
erty rights. Buyers of these rights then use the license to sell merchan-
dise bearing an NFL team's logo to NFL fans. Even though separate,
competing individuals own each NFL team, the NFL collectively re-
quires each team to allow a single agency to sell its valuable property
rights to merchandisers. The single agency then occasionally enters
into an exclusive deal with a single merchandiser so that one merchan-
diser then creates all the NFL merchandise that fans may purchase to
support their team. No one else may offer products that are more cre-
ative or less expensive because the exclusive deal eliminated
competitors.
Without acquiring a given team's intellectual property rights, a mer-
chandiser cannot sell a product bearing that team's logo. Thus, be-
cause the NFL's collective licensing agent sells all NFL teams'
property rights to a single, behemoth merchandiser-like Reebok-
smaller merchandisers have no opportunity to compete, at least
legally.
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With surprising regularity, appellate courts continue to decide
whether sports leagues are single entities differently. The Supreme
Court has not stepped in to resolve the circuit split. After recently
asking the Solicitor General for advice in reviewing a petition for cer-
tiorari in the American Needle case,9 the Court has decided to hear
American Needle. Congress, until Rep. Waters' comments in late Oc-
tober 2009,10 continued to sit on the sidelines, even though it previ-
ously acted to exempt a very similar practice by sports leagues from
antitrust law.''
In Part I, this paper will describe how U.S. sports leagues sell intel-
lectual property rights. Part II will then explain the relevant antitrust
law, why collective licensing presents an antitrust problem, and how
the Seventh Circuit created a circuit split by granting the NFL the
single entity defense. Finally, in Part III, I will call on the Supreme
Court to resolve the single entity circuit split, and illustrate how Con-
gress can override the Court if it disagrees with the Court's resolution
of the split.
PART I: SPORTS LEAGUES' COLLECTIVE LICENSING AGENCIES
The United States has four major sports leagues: the NFL, Major
League Baseball (MLB), National Hockey League (NHL), and Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA).1 2 Each league is similarly struc-
tured. Wealthy individuals typically own franchises. Each franchise is
a member of its respective league. Each franchise remains responsible
for hiring coaches, players, and employees, and then training each of
these individuals to promote on-field play in order to lure fans into
stadium seats to generate revenue. To attract fans, owners give their
collection of individuals an identity. The identity is a team name. A
catchy, aesthetically-appealing logo helps fans identify with the team
they support. So rather than calling a favorite team "the collection of
players named Tony Romo, Marion Barber 1II, Roy Williams,
DeMarcus Ware, and others owned by Jerry Jones," one can simply
say "the Dallas Cowboys" and point to the famous Cowboys' Star. A
collective identity conveniently lends itself to marketing the "Dallas
Cowboys" name alongside the Star on apparel for fans to wear to
show their support.
9. SCOTUSBLOG, Obama, the Hat, and the Court, March 4, 2009, http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/obama-the-hat-and-the-court/.
10. Associated Press, supra note 8.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2008).
12. MAJOR LEAGUE SPORTS ALMANAC, Sports History front around the World, http://www.
geocities.com/prosportshistory/ at "The Big Four," (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
AMERICAN NEEDLE
Some teams are more popular than others, sell more merchandise,
and generate more revenue. With more revenue, these teams could
spend more money to acquire better football talent. And better on-
field talent typically gives a team a better chance to win games.' 3
Professional sports leagues, though, must ensure that teams are gen-
erally equal. 14 If one team consistently annihilated its competitors,
fans would lose interest. After all, fans are drawn to sports in large
part because they offer an uncertain outcome. Professional sports
leagues have devised a variety of plans to make teams more finan-
cially even.' 5
As some waiters in restaurants "pool" their tips at the end of a shift
and split them equally, sports leagues decided that teams would do the
same after selling trademark licenses to merchandisers.' 6 Rather than
each team fending for itself and keeping its own merchandising reve-
nues, the teams collectively sell their intellectual property rights
through a single entity, and then share the revenues equally from each
sale. For instance, MLB's agreement requires all "Clubs ... [to] ap-
point MLBP as their exclusive agent worldwide to conduct, for their
benefit, directly or indirectly ... all (i) Promotional Licensing Activi-
ties; (ii) Retail Licensing Activities; [and] (iii) licensing of all Content
. . . ." MLBP is Major League Baseball Properties, Inc., and it
alones licenses all MLB teams' intellectual property rights to mer-
chandisers. The MLB agreement expressly stated that "each of the
Clubs hereby agrees that it will not grant any third party the right to
use, or license for use, any of its Content or its Media Rights to
Games during the term of this Agreement."' 8 The Agreement is only
13. Perhaps the timing of my Dallas Cowboys analogy is poor. Even with superior talent, and
a higher payroll relative to other teams, the Cowboys have managed to define mediocrity over
the past fifteen years.
14. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 88 (2003). Zimbalist explains that "high payrolls greatly increase the probability of
strong team performance, while low payrolls greatly lower this probability." Id. Leagues, there-
fore, strive to balance competition so that no one team will consistently beat opponents.
15. Many leagues use a variety of devices to achieve competitive balance, including a salary
cap, player draft, or revenue-sharing agreement. In MLB, which does not have a salary cap, the
owners indicated n 2002 that they wanted three devices in the new collective bargaining agree-
ment to promote competitive balance: a luxury tax, an increase in revenue sharing, and a world-
wide player draft. See Andrew P. Hanson, The Trend Toward Principled Negotiation in Major
League Baseball Collective Bargaining, 12 Sports L. J. 221, 233 (2008).
16. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Agency Agreement Among the Various Major League
Professional Baseball Clubs, The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, and Major League
Baseball Properties, Inc., § 7.7 (a), Nov. 1, 2006.
17. Amended and Restated Agency Agreement Among the Various Major League Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, and Major League Baseball
Properties, Inc., § 2.1 (a), Nov. 1, 2006.
18. Id. at § 2.7.
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effective upon a three-fourths vote of the member-Clubs. 19 It pro-
vides that MLBP sells the Clubs' content to a merchandiser, and after
it deducts its commission and expenses for acting as the exclusive
agent, the Clubs agree that MLBP will pay the remaining income "in
equal shares out of the MLBP Accounts" to each Club.20 At least
three-fourths of the teams agreed that all thirty MLB teams would use
an exclusive licensing agent and thereafter share revenues equally,
which MLB teams now do.
MLB is not alone in granting exclusive licenses. Each of the four
major U.S. sports leagues does so with different exclusive agent
names. The NFL's agent is called NFL Properties, 21 the NHL's is
NHL ICE,2 2 and the NBA's is NBA Properties, Inc. 2 3 Of the four
sports leagues, only MLB still has no salary cap. 2 4 A salary cap is
meant to maintain competitive balance between a league's teams by
capping salary expenses of each team so that no one team exorbitantly
spends to acquire superior talent.25 But the leagues with salary caps
still agree to use an exclusive licensing agent, purportedly for competi-
tive balance.
Thus, currently, all major sports employ an exclusive licensing
agent. Collective agents then sell licensing rights to merchandisers so
they can create apparel for the consuming public. NFL Properties, for
example, licensed all NFL teams' licenses for headwear to a single
merchandiser, Reebok.26 Because of the exclusive license, smaller
merchandisers, like American Needle Inc., have alleged that they lost
the chance to compete in the NFL headwear market.27
A critical issue for collective licensing by sports leagues is whether
antitrust law even governs the conduct at all. If sports leagues' collec-
tive licensing conduct is not permissible, it will be because it violates
antitrust law.
19. Id. at § 3. The teams agreed not to allow any rule changes affecting all teams without
three-fourths of the teams approving the change.
20. Id. at § 7.7.
21. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2008).
22. Madison Square Garden v. Nat'l Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007 WL
3254421 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
23. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article XXXVII § 1, July 25, 2005.
24. J.M. Van Horn, Does Baseball Need a Salary Cap?, HELIUM.COM, http://www.helium.com/
items/591746-does-baseball-need-a-salary-cap (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
25. Zimbalist, supra note 14.
26. Am. Needle Inc., 538 U.S. F.3d at 738.
27. Id.
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PART II: ANTITRUST LAW'S APPLICATION
TO COLLECTIVE LICENSING
A. Section One: Agreements Unreasonably
Restraining Interstate Trade28
1. Restraints of Trade
The first Section One element requires an agreement, the central
focus of this paper.29 But before exploring the first element in-depth,
the second and third elements deserve brief attention. The "restraint
of trade" element, "if read in the narrowest possible way . .. could be
deemed . . ." to prohibit any agreement between businesses. 30 The
Supreme Court, however, adopted a "rule of reason" analysis in
United States v. Standard Oil for most Section One violations so that
only agreements unreasonably restraining trade are illegal.3 '
"[B]ecause of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtues," some agreements "are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal ... .. "3 2 In other words, if a given
agreement imposes a naked restraint on trade, courts will declare it
per se illegal, without inquiring into the restraint's reasonableness. 33
Courts can identify these naked restraints only "after considerable ex-
perience with certain business relationships" and can then declare
them per se illegal each time they see them.34 Generally, horizontal
restraints on competition have no purpose other than stifling competi-
tion.35 Horizontal restraints are agreements among competitors, for
example, agreements between competing manufacturers, competing
28. Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to free economic competition from undue
restraints of trade and to prevent businesses from monopolizing markets. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). The Sherman Act boasts two primary sections designed
to combat these harms. Id. at 49-50. The first section states that "[e]very contract, combination
. . ., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . is declared to
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). Section One aimed to prohibit individuals or businesses from
making agreements designed to unduly restrain economic competition. Id. at 59-60. To show
that another violated this provision, then, an individual must show that (1) two or more entities
made an agreement (2) in restraint of trade (3) affecting interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
Because Congress wrote the Act broadly and without guidance as to what conduct satisfies each
element, courts further defined each of these elements. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at
59-60.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
30. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972).
31. See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 62.
32. N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
33. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609, 611.
34. Id. at 607-08.
35. Id. at 608.
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distributors, or competing retailers. 36 Thus, per se restraints require
no economic analysis.
In contrast, rule of reason cases, or cases where the agreement at
hand is not obviously an unreasonable restraint of trade, require a
court to balance competitive effects.37 Specifically, a court must bal-
ance a practice's anticompetitive effects against its procompetitive jus-
tifications.38 The analysis requires both the plaintiff and defendant to
bear the burden of proof at times.3 9 Initially, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's agreement has an anticompetitive-or substan-
tially adverse-effect on competition. 40 If the plaintiff does so suc-
cessfully, then the defendant must offer procompetitive justifications
for its conduct.4 1 If the defendant shows procompetitive justifications,
then the plaintiff may respond by showing that the defendant could
engage in less restrictive conduct to achieve its desired goal.4 2 If each
party meets its burden, the fact-finder must weigh the anticompetitive
effects against the procompetitive justifications to determine if the
conduct is reasonable. 43 Thus, the rule of reason differs from per se
analysis because courts do not categorically determine that the chal-
lenged conduct is anticompetitive without considering any procompe-
titive justifications. 44
The determination of whether challenged conduct deserves rule of
reason analysis, then, is critical. In the cases involving sports leagues,
courts characterize the leagues as needing horizontal restraints of
some sort to offer a product at all.4 5 In NCAA v. Board of Regents,
the Supreme Court noted that "[h]orizontal price fixing and output
limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an 'ille-
gal per se' approach .... ."46 It recognized, however, that because the
competitive sports industry requires horizontal restraints on competi-
tion if the product-competition itself-is to be available at all,
sports' leagues otherwise per se illegal horizontal restraints deserve
rule of reason review.47 Thus, in Board of Regents, even though the
36. See id.
37. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 n.16 (1977).
38. Id. at 50 n.16.
39. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (3rd Cir. 1998).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1017.
45. Id. at 1018.
46. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100
(1984).
47. Id. at 100-01, 103.
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NCAA-member schools agreed through the NCAA to limit individual
schools' ability to negotiate television contracts, thereby horizontally
limiting output, the Court applied rule of reason review to the
NCAA's conduct. 4 8 A sports-related characterization, then, saved the
NCAA from per se illegality. It did not, however, save the NCAA
from illegality under the rule of reason.
After networks began to televise football games, NCAA schools be-
gan to worry that live attendance at non-televised games would suf-
fer.4 9 Through the NCAA, the member schools agreed to contract
exclusively with ABC and CBS for a four-year period from 1982-
1985.5o The schools also agreed to limit the number of appearances
any one team may have and to set the number of games that the net-
works must broadcast.5 1 While each network had to broadcast at least
82 games during each two-year period, from 1982-1983 and 1984-1985,
no single university could appear more than six total times in a given
year or four times nationally.52 In response to the plan, several of the
prominent programs banded together to form a group to negotiate
separately with networks for television appearances. 53 After the new
group successfully negotiated a deal with NBC, the NCAA threatened
to sanction any participating universities in football and other sports,
as well. 5 4 Because the NCAA prohibited individual schools from ne-
gotiating with networks outside of the plan, prices were higher and
output-televised games-was lower than it would have been.55
After narrowly defining the affected market as telecasts for college
football, the Court went on to find the NCAA's restrictive television
plan unreasonable for several reasons. The Court first reasoned that
"[s]ince broadcasting rights to college football constitutes a unique
product for which there is no ready substitute, there is no need for
collective action in order to enable the product to compete against
nonexistent competition." 56 The Court also rejected the NCAA's pur-
ported justification in protecting live attendance at games since the
Sherman Act is designed to foster competition. Thus, "'the Rule of
Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that com-
48. Id. at 98, 103.
49. Id. at 115.
50. Id. at 92.
51. Id. at 94.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 94-5.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 106-08.
56. Id. at 115. In this case, the "collective action" was the agreement between the NCAA-
member institutions through the NCAA to restrict television output.
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petition itself is unreasonable.' 57  The Court also rejected the
NCAA's argument that it needed the plan for competitive balance.
This justification failed both because the NCAA did not show that the
television plan actually equalized competition and because it was not
even tailored to serving that interest in the first place.58 Instead, the
plan merely imposed a restriction "on one source of revenue that is
more important to some colleges than to others."59 The NCAA's plan
was, therefore, illegal under the Sherman Act primarily because it
eliminated competition and did not actually promote competitive bal-
ance. 60 Even the Court's sports-based rule of reason could not save
the NCAA from antitrust liability.
2. Agreement6"
a. Agreements and Combinations
Section One of the Sherman Act requires concerted action that un-
reasonably restrains interstate trade.62 "The Sherman Act contains a
'basic distinction between concerted and independent action." 63 Sec-
tion Two condemns certain conduct by single firms approaching or
attaining monopolization. 64 When conduct results from concerted ac-
tivity, however, Section One applies "more sternly than unilateral ac-
tivity under § 2."65 Congress treated concerted activity more strictly
because it is "inherently fraught with anticompetitive risk" when "two
or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately
are combining to act as one for their common benefit." 66 Horizontal
agreements to fix prices, allocate markets, or rig bids are deemed per
se illegal because they interfere with the free market's operation.67
57. Id. at 117 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof7 Eng'rs v. Unites States, 453 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)).
58. Id. at 117-9.
59. Id. at 119-20.
60. Id. at 120.
61. As I explained above, Section One has three elements, the second of which is that the
agreement restraining trade must also affect interstate commerce. For over 80 years, the Court
said baseball did not affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
Nat'l League of Prof'I Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-85 (1972). Congress did,
however, recently pass the Curt Flood Act, which makes baseball "subject to the antitrust laws"
just like other sports. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (a) (2002). The second element of Section One is,
therefore, given in the sports context when each professional league plays games in multiple U.S.
states and Canada.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
63. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
64. Id. at 767-68.
65. Id. at 768.
66. Id. at 768-69.
67. See id. at 768.
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i. Single entity status: Copperweld
A firm's internal coordination between officers, directors, and em-
ployees is unilateral action.68 Coordination between a corporation
and one of its own unincorporated divisions is also unilateral action. 69
In Copperweld v. Independence Tube, the Supreme Court held that
action between a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary was
that of a single enterprise not subject to Section One. 70 The Court
reasoned that a corporation should not be punished because it clothes
one of its subunits in different clothing-as a corporation rather than
an unincorporated subdivision.71 The "corporation has complete
power to maintain a wholly owned subsidiary in either form."72
If the Court had held otherwise, it would force corporations to cre-
ate subunits as unincorporated divisions rather than as wholly owned
corporations, depriving consumers of the benefits of corporations over
unincorporated divisions.73 Thus, when the parent company "may as-
sert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the
parent's best interests," the two act as a single unit.74 Single units do
not fall within Section One, and therefore do not face rule of reason
review.75 If a firm acts as a single entity, the plaintiff's claim, if any,
must arise from Section Two's prohibition against monopolization. As
the Court in Copperweld explained, a plaintiff must produce stronger
evidence and a court must engage in more thorough analysis to find
an antitrust violation under Section Two. 7 6
68. Id. at 769.
69. Id. at 770.
70. Id. at 771.
71. Id. at 773-4.
72. Id. at 772.
73. Id. at 772-3. The Court explained the benefits in saying, "[s]eparate incorporation may
reduce federal or state taxes or facilitate compliance with regulatory or reporting laws. Local
incorporation may also improve local identification. Investors or lenders may prefer to specialize
in a particular aspect of a conglomerate's business. Different parts of the business may require
different pension or profit-sharing plans or different accounting practices." Id. at 773 n.20.
74. Id. at 771-2.
75. Id.
76. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-8 (1984). A single firm,
under Section Two review, may be aggressive and efficient. It may, therefore, take consumers
from an inefficient competitor without violating antitrust laws. It is important for courts to dis-
tinguish between superior firms increasing in size as opposed to firms using anticompetitive tac-
tics to increase size. A plaintiff, then, must provide evidence to define the market, prove the
firm has monopoly power in that market, and show that a firm used an illegal practice to obtain
or maintain monopoly power.
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ii. Sports leagues' conduct as the result of a Section One
agreement
In the sports context, federal circuit courts are split on whether
sports leagues are single entities. This section will organize the sports
league decisions into: (1) cases where courts have found an agreement
and (2) cases where courts have found the conduct to be that of a
single entity.
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court held that the "NCAA is an
association of schools which compete against each other to attract tel-
evision revenues, not to mention fans and athletes."77 The Court also
said that "participating in an association which prevents member insti-
tutions from competing against each other on the basis of price or
kind . . ." creates "a horizontal restraint-an agreement among competi-
tors on the way in which they will compete with one another."78 The
NCAA-member Division-I Universities therefore did have an agree-
ment, even though they acted through the NCAA-a separate, pri-
vate entity.7 9 Board of Regents was decided on June 27, 1984.80
Copperweld-the Court's seminal single entity case- was decided on
June 19, 1984, only eight days before Board of Regents.8' Yet the
Court did not even mention the single entity issue in Board of Re-
gents, a case involving 187 universities acting through the voluntary
NCAA. 82 Instead, the Court exempted the NCAA from otherwise
per se treatment.83 As noted, the Court's approach to a sports league
engaging in a horizontal restraint was to examine it under rule of rea-
son analysis rather than the per se rule. 8 4
Over thirty years ago, the Los Angeles (L.A.) Coliseum lost its ten-
ant, the Rams, to the city of St. Louis.8 5 It then began negotiating
with Oakland Raiders' owner Al Davis to move the Raiders to L.A. 86
But NFL rules required unanimous approval of all twenty-eight NFL
team owners for a franchise to move.87 When the owners met regard-
ing the Raiders' move to L.A., twenty-two owners voted against the
77. Nat'il Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99
(1984).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 85.
81. Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 752.
82. See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
83. See id. at 103.
84. Id.
85. L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. NFL et. al., 726 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984).
86. Id.
87. Id. In 1979, the NFL owners met and changed the rule to require three-fourths owners'
approval rather than unanimous consent. Id. at 1385.
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move and five teams abstained.88 Davis would have needed twenty-
four votes favoring the move to prevail. Davis and the Coliseum chal-
lenged the NFL's rules as a Section One antitrust violation, which ulti-
mately led to the Ninth Circuit.89 In defense, the NFL argued that it
operates as a joint venture and is therefore a single entity not subject
to Section One.90 Davis and the Coliseum countered that the NFL
was a league comprised of "28 separate legal entities [acting]
independently." 91
Both the district court and Ninth Circuit agreed with Davis and the
Coliseum. 9 2 The Ninth Circuit held that if it now tolerated such a
loophole, it "would permit league members to escape antitrust re-
sponsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit
their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the bene-
fit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects." 93 It also
found, as the Supreme Court had, that merely labeling an agreement a
"joint venture" does not save it from antitrust scrutiny because "every
agreement and combination in restraint of trade could be so la-
beled." 94 The court noted that while the NFL must cooperate to pro-
duce the NFL season, limited cooperation does not then preclude
Section One scrutiny.95 Because "NFL clubs do compete with one
another off the field as well as on to acquire players, coaches, and
management personnel[,]" Section One applies.96 The court applied
rule of reason review to the NFL's league rule and upheld the jury's
finding, which was that the NFL rule was unnecessary. 97 Thus, rule of
reason review determined whether the rule violated Section One.
Had the court deemed the NFL teams to be acting as a single entity, it
would have dismissed the complaint. The Ninth Circuit therefore held
that the NFL teams formed an agreement restraining trade.
Ten years later, in Sullivan v. NFL, the New England Patriots'
owner challenged the NFL's rule requiring three-fourths of its owners
to approve all transfers of NFL team ownership to anyone other than
family members.98 Sullivan wanted to sell 49% of his ownership to
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1385.
90. Id. at 1387.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1387-8.
93. Id. at 1388.
94. Id. (citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951)).
95. L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm., 726 F.2d at 1389.
96. Id. at 1390.
97. Id. at 1390-8.
98. Id. at 1095.
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the public as publicly traded stock.99 He never sought the needed ap-
proval because he believed it would be futile based on his discussions
with Commissioner Pete Rozelle. 00 Sullivan instead brought a Sec-
tion One action, and won a $38 million jury verdict.o'0 Rather than
assent that the teams acted as a single entity, the NFL first argued that
its teams "do not compete against each other for the sale of their own-
ership interests."10 2 Like the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit held that
"it is well established that NFL clubs also compete with each other,
both on and off the field, for things like fan support, players, coaches,
ticket sales, local broadcast revenues, and the sale of team parapher-
nalia."103 The NFL argued that the Supreme Court's Copperweld de-
cision required the court to find that the NFL is a single entity. 104 In
response, the First Circuit reiterated that NFL teams do compete, on
and off the field, and therefore "pursue diverse interests and thus are
not a single enterprise under § 1."105
It then applied the rule of reason.106 The court reversed and re-
manded only because the plaintiff discussed prior cases involving the
NFL, and the court felt these cases, coupled with the jury instructions,
might have misled the jury.'0 7 Given a new trial, the court felt the jury
could properly weigh the NFL's proffered justifications against the an-
ticompetitive harms of the rule. 08
Recently, the Sixth Circuit rejected a sports league's single entity
argument. The NHL Player's Association (NHLPA) challenged an
Ontario Hockey League (OHL), a professional major-junior hockey
league with teams in Canada and the United States,109 rule prohibiting
teams from carrying more than three "overage players."" 0 The OHL
required overage players to be registered under either the Canadian
Hockey Association or USA Hockey Player's Registration."' The
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1096.
101. Id. The court reduced this amount to $17 million, and then trebled this amount to $51
million for Sullivan. Id.
102. Id. at 1098.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1099. The Ninth Circuit's decision in L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm. came four
months before the Court decided Copperweld. The NFL must have believed that Copperweld
precluded section one scrutiny for an organization structured like the NFL. So it raised the
argument in this First Circuit case, Sullivan.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1111.
107. Id. at 1113
108. Id. at 1113-4.
109. NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 2005).
110. Id. Overage players are those twenty years old or older.
111. Id.
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NCAA simultaneously prevented players holding either registration
from playing for an NCAA college hockey team.112
Together the two rules prohibited OHL teams from signing NCAA
players because they would not have either of the required registra-
tions. 113 Two twenty-year old hockey players challenged the OHL
rules under Section One.' 1 4 Although the OHL did not argue that it
was a single entity, the Sixth Circuit nonetheless held that "[j]ust as
the National Football League could not be accurately characterized as
a 'single economic entity,' neither could the OHL, which exists only as
constituted by its twenty member teams."115 The OHL's adoption of
the challenged rule thus represented "an agreement between multiple
actors, as required by Section 1 of the Sherman Act."ll 6
Like other circuit courts, the Sixth Circuit then reviewed the OHL's
conduct under the rule of reason." 7 The players' claim against the
OHL failed because they could not demonstrate antitrust injury ema-
nating from the OHL rule." 8 Similarly, an alleged conspiracy be-
tween the OHL and NHL failed because they did not show requisite
antitrust injury.' 19
In September of 2008, one month after the Seventh Circuit decided
the American Needle case to be discussed later in the paper, the Sec-
ond Circuit joined the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits with its decision
in MLBP v. Salvino.120 MLBP acts exclusively to collectively license
all intellectual property for the 30 MLB teams.121Salvino makes and
sells stuffed plush animals similar to "beanie babies" that bear MLB
team logos.12 2Until 1998, Salvino secured licenses from MLB before
selling merchandise bearing MLB logos.1 2 3 In 1998, however, MLB
learned that Salvino sold the plush animals to a MLB club without
obtaining a license from MLBP.124 MLBP sent Salvino a cease-and-
desist letter in 1999 and Salvino responded by filing an antitrust suit,
alleging both Section One and Two violations.125
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 467-9.
115. Id. at 470 (internal citations omitted).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 471.
118. See id. at 473-4.
119. Id. at 475-6.
120. MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2008).
121. Id. at 294.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 295.
125. Id.
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Salvino's Section One claim accused the MLB teams' agreements to
collectively license and equally share revenues of reducing output, di-
minishing the products' quality and number of choices to consumers,
and raising prices by suppressing price competition. 126 MLBP moved
for summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion, dis-
missing Salvino's Section One Claim.127 The district court held that
the rule of reason applied, and not the per se or quick look rules, but
Salvino had failed to meet its burden to show anticompetitive effects
of the MLB teams' agreement to designate MLBP as the collective
licensing agent.128
On appeal, Salvino argued that the district court should have ap-
plied either the per se or quick look rule.129 The Second Circuit
agreed with the district court that "antitrust challenges to the opera-
tions of sports leagues have generally been analyzed by the court
under the rule of reason, rather than being held illegal per se . . . ."130
The rule of reason applied to the MLB teams' agreement even though
the teams "do not operate separately or independently but rather are
interdependent entities in an organization that is highly integrated."' 3 1
While Salvino only argued that the district court erred in applying the
rule of reason, and did not also argue that it incorrectly applied the
rule of reason, the Second Circuit nonetheless examined the district
court's rule of reason application and said it was correct.132 The Sec-
ond Circuit also emphasized that MLBP was willing to license "the
intellectual property of some or all of the Clubs, or of any single
Club" and that "the number of licenses granted has multiplied" since
it began collectively licensing intellectual property.'33
The Second Circuit limited its holding to the facts before it, and
"express[ed] no opinion as to what the outcome would be [if] a plain-
tiff . . . adduced admissible evidence as to the reasonableness . . ." of
the MLB teams centralizing intellectual property licensing in
MLBP.134 The Second Circuit, therefore, upheld the district court's
opinion dismissing Salvino's Section One claim because it believed the
district court had correctly applied the rule of reason and Salvino had
126. Id.
127. Id. at 295-6.
128. Id. at 306-8.
129. Id. at 309.
130. Id. at 332.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 334.
133. Id. at 323. 326. Thus, the MLB teams' agreement to license seems to significantly differ
from the NFL teams' agreement. which I discuss later in the context of American Needle. See
infra at pg. 36.
134. Id.
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failed to meet his initial burden to show the anticompetitive effects of
the MLB plan.1 35 Thus, the First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
have all held that sports leagues' rules are agreements between mem-
ber clubs subject to the rule of reason, and not single entity action
subject to Section Two. 1 3 6
iii. Sports leagues' conduct as that of a single entity subject to
Section Two
Even though several federal appellate courts apply rule of reason
analysis to sports leagues' conduct, a few courts continue to dismiss
Section One claims because they believe sports leagues are single enti-
ties. The NFL recently signed a four-year extension with DirecTV for
the NFL Sunday Ticket Package that pays the NFL $1 billion annu-
ally.137 The deal is exclusive: only DirecTV may broadcast all of the
NFL's games in one place and offer the service to fans for a fee.138
The NFL teams collectively consummated the deal with DirecTV
through a single agent, NFL Properties.139 Thus, all thirty-two NFL
teams agreed to allow NFL Properties to sell each team's intellectual
property to merchandisers.
No Section One violation is possible here because Congress has ex-
pressly allowed collective licensing for TV broadcast rights in its 1961
"Sports Broadcasting Act."l 40 The Act expressly exempts from anti-
trust law any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or
conducting the organized professional team sports of football, base-
ball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating
in [these sports] contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of
the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting
of the games of [such sports].141
135. Id. at 334.
136. See id.; see also L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. NFL et. al.. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984); see also Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); see also NHLPA v. Plymouth Whal-
ers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005). In November of 2007, the Southern District of
New York, sitting in the Second Circuit, also applied rule of reason review to the NHL's New
Media Guide, which therefore establishes that it believed the NHL teams agreed to employ the
challenged restraints. See generally Madison Square Garden v. NHL. No. 07 CV 8455(LAP),
2007 WL 3254421 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
137. Mike Reynolds, NFL Scores with $4 Billion DirecTV Sunday Ticket Extension, March 3,
2009, http://www.multichannel.com/article/190542-NFLScoresWith_4_BillionDirecTVSun-
dayTicketExtension.php?rssid=20059.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2008).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
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Sports leagues are therefore expressly allowed to form collective
agencies to sell television broadcast rights.142 The Act limits permissi-
ble collective action to "telecasting," and not also to the collective li-
censing of team intellectual property rights.143 Congress has not
enacted a similar exemption for collective licensing of team intellec-
tual property rights. Despite several circuit courts holding that sports
leagues' actions are agreements and despite Congress's failure to en-
act legislation allowing collective action in any context other than
broadcasting, the Seventh Circuit has found two different sports
leagues to be acting as single entities.
First, in 1996, Judge Easterbrook faced an ongoing legal wrangle
between the NBA and Chicago Bulls.144 Amid their great success in
the 1990s, the Bulls wanted to broadcast many of their games on the
WGN superstation.145 The NBA, however, had contracted with NBC
for all teams to broadcast a large portion of NBA games, leaving only
fifteen games for the Bulls to broadcast on WGN.146 While sports
leagues do have the power to collectively agree on TV broadcasting
rights under the Sports Broadcasting Act,147 the NBA attracted anti-
trust scrutiny by trying to curtail the Bulls' WGN transmissions after it
allowed the Bulls to select a broadcaster for select games.148
The district court held that Copperweld does not apply to the NBA
when it lacks "complete unity of interest." 49 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that whether the NBA is a joint venture subject to
Section One or a single entity subject to Section Two "is a tough ques-
tion under Copperweld."o50 The Seventh Circuit first held that the
Sports Broadcasting Act reopens the Sherman Act when a party does
not comply with the Act's policy.' 5 ' Facing antitrust scrutiny, the
142. Id. The Act's legislative history indicates that Congress passed the Act to exempt "joint
agreements under which a league sells or transfers pooled television rights of its member clubs to
a purchaser." H.R. REP. No. 1178, at 3 (1961). Before Congress passed the Act, the NFL's
agreement to collectively sell broadcasting rights was illegal under Section One. See id. at 2.
143. See id. Neither the House Report nor the Senate Report contemplates collective licens-
ing for intellectual property rights. See HR 1178, supra note 142; see generally S.R. REP. No.
1087 (1961).
144. Chi. Prof'1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1996).
145. Id. at 595-96.
146. Id.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2008).
148. Chi. Profi Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d at 596. The NBA attempted to control cable re-
transmission in the Bulls' home market for WGN games, even though its contract with NBC
allowed the Bulls to select a network. Id.
149. Id. at 598.
150. Id. at 599.
151. Id. The Act allows a league to collectively license telecasts and avoid antitrust liability,
but the league will incur additional responsibilities and tax ramifications by licensing games. In
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NBA argued that it was acting as a single entity and should not be
subject to Section One treatment.152 The Seventh Circuit believed a
sports league could be acting as a single entity in some contexts but
acting as a joint venture or as multiple entities in another, making it
necessary to judge each league's conduct on a case-by-case basis. 53
But "when acting in the broadcast market . . . ," the court believed
"the NBA is closer to a single firm than to a group of independent
firms." 54
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, Judge Easterbrook
also discussed three points along a spectrum that indicate the type of
conduct in which parties engage. Conduct, therefore, could be that of
a single entity, a joint venture between competitors, or a horizontal
agreement between competitors.'55 Judge Easterbrook, however,
later failed to mention the possibility that the NBA acted as a joint
venture when he said, "the NBA is closer to a single firm than to a
group of independent firms."l 5 6 According to his initial formulation
of the spectrum, it would seem that if the NBA is not acting as a single
entity, but is also not acting in a wholly independent manner, then it
must be acting as a joint venture-the mid-point on the action spec-
trum.157 Judge Easterbrook said that the lower court should apply full
rule of reason review even after he said he thought the NBA acted as
a single entity.1ss
In a concurring opinion, Judge Cudahy criticized the majority opin-
ion.' 59 As the First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits illustrated,
Judge Cudahy explained that a single entity finding immunizes the de-
fendant from Section One treatment.' 60 Judge Cudahy's concurrence,
therefore, disagreed with the majority opinion because it failed to
properly depict the "continuum of economic integration."'61 Judge
Easterbrook should have either placed the NBA in the middle of that
continuum, thus requiring full rule of reason analysis, or characterized
this case, the NBA did not want to be the licensor, but instead the regulator of licensing. It
wanted to regulate how each team individually licensed games. The NBA, therefore, did not act
as a licensor so as to avoid antitrust liability.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 599-600.
154. Id. at 600.
155. Id. at 598.
156. Id. at 600.
157. To see an illustration of the continuum, see Continuum, supra note 4.
158. Id. at 600-01.
159. Id. at 601 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
160. Id.
161. Id.
2010] 161
162 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 6:143
the NBA as a single entity not subject to Section One.162 Instead,
Judge Easterbook characterized the NBA as a single entity and re-
manded the case to the district court for rule of reason review.163
In August of 2008, the Seventh Circuit decided American Needle v.
NFL, and American Needle forms the basis of this paper because the
court found the NFL to be acting as a single entity in the collective
licensing context.164 The NFL teams agreed in 1963 to allow NFL
Properties LLC to collectively license each team's intellectual proper-
ties rights.165 Until 2000, NFL Properties allowed several merchandis-
ers to produce headwear bearing NFL logos.1 66 It then required
vendors to submit bids for an exclusive headwear license.'67 Reebok,
as a large apparel manufacturer, won the bidding war. American Nee-
dle, and other headwear merchandisers, lost their headwear li-
censes.168 American Needle then filed an antitrust suit against the
NFL, the NFL's teams, NFL Properties, and Reebok.169 For its Sec-
tion One claim, American Needle argued that the NFL teams and
Reebok agreed to eliminate headwear competition because each NFL
team could individually sell licenses but each team instead chose to
collectively license to a single headwear licensee.170 American Needle
also argued that the NFL teams illegally monopolized team licensing
and product wholesale by agreeing to allow NFL Properties to collec-
tively license intellectual property rights.' 7'
With Easterbrook's 1996 Chi. Prof'1 Sports decision as precedent,
the NFL argued that Copperweld mandates that it have single entity
status.172 In a summary judgment proceeding, the district court
agreed, thereby rejecting the Section One claim.' 73 It also dismissed
American Needle's Section Two monopolization claim because a sin-
gle entity may collectively license intellectual property "'without run-
ning afoul of the antitrust laws."1 74
162. Id. at 601-02.
163. Id. at 600-01.
164. Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).
165. Id. at 737. Two years after Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act, then, the NFL
agreed to allow collective licensing for intellectual property. The Act, again, only allows collec-
tive action for broadcasting rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2008).
166. Am. Needle Inc., 538 F.3d at 738.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 739-40.
174. Id.
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that "American Nee-
dle's argument leads us into murky waters" 75 and limited its decision
to the facts before it.176 American Needle argued that the court must
look to how the challenged conduct deprives the market of indepen-
dent sources of economic control because Copperweld was concerned
with the anticompetitive effects collective action introduces into the
market.'77 The court agreed with American Needle. 78 American
Needle also argued that a single entity determination turns "entirely
on whether the league's members can compete with one another when
licensing and marketing their intellectual property."1 79 The Seventh
Circuit did not agree because it believed it was only one step away
from requiring NFL teams to have "complete unity of interest" to be a
single entity, which would be "'silly." 80
The Seventh Circuit "could not fault the district court for not con-
sidering whether the NFL teams could compete against one another
when licensing and marketing their intellectual property."' 8 ' Hence,
on appeal, the Seventh Circuit thought the district court need not
even consider whether NFL teams compete against each other in the
headwear market or the extent to which they do.182 Because the
"NFL teams share a vital economic interest in collectively promoting
football," the court believed that "nothing in § 1 prohibits the NFL
teams from cooperating so the league can compete against other en-
tertainment providers."'8 3 It therefore found the NFL teams to be
acting as a single entity.184
Had the Court found an agreement and applied the rule of reason,
the plaintiff would have demonstrated the anticompetitive effects of
collective licensing and the defendant would have proffered procom-
petitive justifications for the rule. American Needle could then show
that the NFL could meet its objective of promoting NFL football
through less restrictive means.'85 In other words, the NFL teams
175. Id. at 741.
176. Id. at 742.
177. Id. at 742.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 743.
180. Id.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 743.
183. Id. at 744.
184. Id.
185. See id.; see also Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (3rd Cir.
1998).
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could still promote football without a collective licensing agent for in-
tellectual property.' 8 6
The Seventh Circuit also upheld the district court's dismissal of the
Section Two claim, ruling that, as a single entity, "NFL teams are free
under § 2 to license their intellectual property on an exclusive basis,
even if the teams opt to reduce the number of companies to whom
they grant licenses."'8 7 In one fell swoop, the Seventh Circuit immu-
nized the NFL from antitrust scrutiny, and while it said it determines
single entity status on a case-by-case basis, it found the NFL to be a
single entity without ever citing its sister courts' decisions in L.A. Me-
morial Coliseum Comm., Plymouth Whalers, or Salvino, where the
courts held the NFL, NHL, and MLB were not acting as single enti-
ties.' 88 The Seventh Circuit also failed to mention that Congress did
pass a statute to allow collective licensing for television broadcasting,
but has not for collective licensing of intellectual property.18 9 Instead
the Seventh Circuit legislated from the bench to immunize the NFL
from antitrust scrutiny.
Without competition, Reebok can limit supply, force fans to take
the products it offers or leave them, and also likely increase prices for
NFL hats. Fans are not happy about it. Just one month before the
American Needle decision, Tampa Bay Buccaneers fans voiced their
unhappiness with Reebok's limited headwear supply in an online
blog.o90 One fan said that MLB fans can turn to a number of
headwear companies when buying a hat, including Nike, New Era,
and Twins Franchise, to name a few.191 But NFL fans can only turn to
Reebok.19 2 The blame for fans' displeasure, according to the fan and
186. Am. Needle Inc., 538 F.3d at 744. The NFL might be more effectively promoted if more
popular teams secure more lucrative deals than less popular teams. The NFL does not say why it
needs to promote each team equally rather than promoting the more popular teams over the less
popular. It seems as though the more popular teams would secure more profitable deals, or at
least generate greater profit, acting alone than the equal share they receive after NFL Properties
secures a deal by collectively licensing each team.
187. Id.
188. See L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. NFL et. al., 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005); see also MLB Props.,
Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290. 334 (2nd Cir. 2008). The Court cited Sullivan once in a paren-
thesis only to show that the First Circuit had not adopted its 1996 decision in Chicago Prof'I
Sports Ltd. P'ship. So the Court really did not discuss any of the other Circuit Courts' single
entity decisions, even though they applied Copperweld. Instead it simply interpreted Copperweld
on its own and issued its own decision-an outlier at that.
189. See generally Arn. Needle Inc.. 538 F.3d 736.
190. JScott. NFL Should Rethink Reebok Exclusive Rights Deal, Buc'EM.com, July 14, 2008,
http://www.bucem.com/2008/7/14/56971 1/nfl-should-rethink-reebok.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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several other discontent fans, "falls squarely on Reebok and the
NFL's ignorance." 93 Thanks to the Seventh Circuit, though, no court
ever reviewed the anticompetitive effects of the NFL-Reebok agree-
ment to see how the exclusive deal harms fans.194
American Needle filed a petition for certiorari on November 17,
2008. On June 29, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
American Needle.195
B. Section Two: Illegal use of Monopoly Power
Even if a sports league did act as a single entity in developing a
collective licensing agent-or if a court decides that it did- the
league must still ensure that it does not violate Section Two's prohibi-
tion against illegal monopolies.
Under Section Two, "[e]very person who shall monopolize, . . . at-
tempt to monopolize, . . . combine, or conspire with any other person
... to monopolize any part of [interstate trade or commerce]" is guilty
of a felony.196 A single actor's conduct, then, is "governed by § 2
alone . . ." and is unlawful if it actually monopolizes a market or at-
tempts to monopolize it by threatening actual monopolization. 9 7
Thus, antitrust laws will not "dampen the competitive zeal of a single
aggressive entrepreneur" unless that entrepreneur poses a danger of
monopolization.198 The possession of monopoly power alone does not
constitute a Section Two violation. Instead a firm must both (1) pos-
sess monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willfully acquire
or maintain that power in a way other than simply acquiring it through
a superior product or service.199
Monopolies may enter into exclusive contracts, but only to a limited
extent. The Supreme Court prohibits using monopoly power to ex-
clude competitors from the marketplace. 200 In other words, if a single
entity with monopoly power attempts to willfully acquire or maintain
its monopoly power by engaging in conduct designed to eliminate
193. Id. The "ignorance" to which this fan refers is likely a criticism of the NFL for not
procuring a headwear deal that responds to consumer demand. The blogger desires greater se-
lection, which is not possible when Reebok alone manufactures hats.
194. Am. Needle Inc., 538 F.3d at 744.
195. See Associated Press, supra note 7.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
197. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
198. Id. at 768.
199. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
200. See Verizon Comms. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408-09
(2004).
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competitors in a market, it is guilty of a Section Two illegal
monopoly. 201
The Court has found a sports league to be a monopoly. In Board of
Regents, the Court recognized that "[w]hen a product is controlled by
one interest, without substitutes available in the market, there is mo-
nopoly power." 202 Even though the Court did not need to examine
the NCAA's monopoly power when the plaintiff brought a Section
One claim, it nevertheless concluded that the NCAA held a monopoly
over college football telecasts-a market it narrowly defined. 203 In
American Needle, a collective licensing agent holds all intellectual
property rights for every team. Assuming a league's teams are acting
as a single entity, the single entity must possess monopoly power over
the league.
Just as the NCAA held a monopoly over college football telecasts,
NFL Properties holds a monopoly over NFL teams' intellectual prop-
erty rights. When it then sells the intellectual property rights for a
product to a single merchandiser, the merchandiser holds a monopoly
over that product. The agreement between the NFL and Reebok, for
example, gives Reebok alone the right to create headwear bearing
NFL logos. Selling headwear rights to Reebok alone appears to ex-
clude all other competitors from the market, which gives Reebok a
monopoly over NFL hats. Just as the Supreme Court defined the mar-
ket narrowly in Board of Regents to be college football telecasts, it
might also define the market in American Needle to be NFL
headwear, and not all sports headwear. 204 The NFL teams' agreement
and subsequent exclusive license with Reebok creates two monopo-
lies: the NFL's monopoly over all thirty-two NFL teams' intellectual
property and Reebok's monopoly over the NFL headwear market.
While the Trademark Act gives a trademark owner the right to use
and sell the trademark, it "cannot be legally used as a device for [Sec-
tion Two] violation." 205 A trademark-holder, then, may not use the
trademark to monopolize or attempt to monopolize a market.206
Under Section Two, even if a sports league is a single entity, it might
still violate Section Two if it wields its trademark to gain monopoly
power and foreclose competition in a market.
201. See id.
202. Bd. of Regents v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. 85, 111-12 (1984).
203. Id.
204. See id. at 112.
205. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1951), overruled on
other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (citing to
15 U.S.C. § 1115 (b)(7) (1946) (2002)).
206. See id.
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PART III: CALLING ON CONGRESS OR THE SUPREME COURT TO
RESOLVE WHETHER SPORTS LEAGUES ARE SNGLE
ENTITIES WHEN COLLECTIVELY LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Sports leagues are not single economic entities. In fact, they are rife
with competition. While they band together to offer on-field competi-
tion as a product, they still compete with one another on and off the
field. To settle the circuit split, the Supreme Court should overturn
the Seventh Circuit's decision in American Needle and deem collective
licensing to be a joint venture between teams subject to the rule of
reason. Alternatively, if the Court carves out a single entity exemp-
tion for some sports leagues, they should still face Section Two scru-
tiny. If Congress disagrees, it can pass a statute exempting collective
licensing for intellectual property from antitrust scrutiny. As the law
now stands, however, sports leagues outside the Seventh Circuit's ju-
risdiction face Section One scrutiny when they agree to collectively
license intellectual property.
A. Sports leagues' conduct violates Section One
Just as the NCAA member-schools horizontally agreed through the
NCAA to prevent each school from competing to attract television
revenue in Board of Regents,207 So too do sports teams when they
agree through their league to prevent each team from competing to
attract merchandisers. Under Copperweld, a corporation can desig-
nate one of its wholly owned subsidiaries as a separate corporation
and still maintain complete power over it.208 But a sports league is not
similarly structured. Each team is individually owned and each team
owner had complete power over his team until the teams' agreed on
collective licensing. Owners must comply with NFL rules if they want
to play in the NFL. They are not, however, required to join an agree-
ment that arguably violates the Sherman Act. Instead, even though it
may not be economically lucrative, they could withdraw from the NFL
and either play in another league or form their own league to compete
with the NFL, or use their popularity as a bargaining chip to convince
the other NFL teams not to require collective licensing.209
As explained before, the Supreme Court decided Board of Regents
only eight days after it decided Copperweld.210 Yet it still believed the
207. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99
(1984).
208. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772-74 (1984).
209. Teams can do this, even if it would not be economically wise.
210. See supra notes 80-82 (and accompanying text).
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NCAA member-schools horizontally agreed to eliminate competition
for TV broadcasting. Out of respect for the NCAA's proffered goal-
offering competition as a product-the Court applied the rule of rea-
son instead of per se review to the NCAA's otherwise facially illegal
agreement. 2 1 1 The Court was right to deem the teams' conduct an
agreement. Likewise, the NFL offers competition between teams as
its product. It also collectively licenses to promote competitive bal-
ance. Its conduct, like the NCAA's conduct, should be reviewed
under the rule of reason to see if the anticompetitive effects outweigh
the procompetitive. If they do not, then the NFL should alter its plan
to pass Section One scrutiny.
The current NFL plan under attack in American Needle is also un-
like MLB's plan in the Second Circuit's Salvino decision because it is
more anticompetitive. The NFL's plan does not allow NFL Properties
to sell intellectual property of a single club and the number of
headwear licenses has not multiplied since it began collectively licens-
ing.2 12 The NFL admits that it seeks to sell the intellectual property of
all thirty-two teams when it says that its goal is to "ensure that marks
identifying all 32 member clubs are developed, protected, and in-
cluded on the products of each of its consumer product licensees." 213
The NFL's collective licensing agreement is not responsive to con-
sumer demand because it always sells the marks of all thirty-two
teams together, refusing to sell the mark of a single team. Also, before
NFL Properties granted only one headwear license to Reebok, it
granted multiple licenses to merchandisers. 2 14 The exclusive agree-
ment with Reebok is not now increasing the number of licenses sold.
In Salvino, the Second Circuit emphasized each of these points in up-
holding the district court's rule of reason application. The Seventh
Circuit, however, did not apply the rule of reason, even though the
NFL agreement seems to be more restrictive than MLB's agreement
was in Salvino.
B. Single Entity Sports Leagues as Monopolies
NFL Properties controls intellectual property for all thirty-two NFL
teams. No merchandiser can sell NFL apparel without first acquiring
211. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99.
212. See MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 323. 326 (2nd Cir. 2008). The de-
crease in the number of licenses rests on the assumption that, again, the relevant market is NFL
headwear, so only headwear licenses-and not also other NFL apparel licenses-matter, for the
sake of this argument.
213. Defendants-Appellees Brief, Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL. No. 07-4006. 2008 WL 937055 at
*9 (Mar. 25, 2008).
214. Id. at *6.
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a license from NFL Properties. NFL Properties is, therefore, the sole
supplier of licensing rights. If the Supreme Court defines the market
narrowly to be NFL headwear, the NFL has 100% control of the mar-
ket. That is, by definition, a monopoly. 2 15 A plaintiff, like American
Needle, must still show that a sports league's collective licensing agent
abuses monopoly power in the relevant market to prove a Section
Two claim. 2 16 Plaintiffs should show that the NFL teams' agreement
prevents each team from competing against one another and that NFL
Properties' exclusive deal with Reebok excludes headwear competi-
tors.2 17 NFL Properties, which equally distributes revenue to NFL
teams, and Reebok, the sole merchandiser who can sell hats bearing
NFL logos, benefit from the deal as they exclude competitors from the
headwear market. Even if the NFL teams act as a single entity
through NFL Properties, they cannot use a trademark to monopolize
an industry. 218 Thus, even under Section Two review, a sports' leagues
collective licensing to a single licensee violates antitrust laws. The
Sherman Act should apply to sports leagues' collective action, unless
Congress decides to immunize sports leagues from antitrust scrutiny
for collective licensing.
C. A Call to Congress
Hopefully the Supreme Court will soon reaffirm 219 its subtle stance
in Board of RegentS220 showing that it does not believe sports leagues'
conduct constitutes action by a single entity, while also reaffirming the
First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits' opinions. 221
Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act in 1961, reopening
the Sherman Act in a way that directly affected sports leagues. Within
the last few years, Congress addressed MLB's common law antitrust
exemption by making major league baseball subject to the antitrust
laws just like the other major professional sports. 222 So if Congress
can act to resolve a glaring legal inconsistency, it could also do so in
the context of collective licensing. When Congress did not include
215. See id.
216. See Verizon Comms. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398. 408-09
(2004).
217. See id.
218. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1951), overruled
on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (citing
to 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (b)(7) (1946) (2002)).
219. See Associated Press, supra note 7.
220. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99.
221. See L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm., 726 F.2d at 1390 (9th Cir.); see also Sullivan, 34
F.3d at 1099 (1st Cir.); see also Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d at 470 (6th Cir.).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (a) (2002).
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collective licensing of intellectual property in its statutory antitrust ex-
emption, the following latin maxim may apply: expression unius est
exclusion alterius.223 It means "that to express or include one thing
implies the exclusion of the other."224 Here, because Congress did not
also expressly include "collective licensing," it intended to exclude it
from its statutory exemption allowing collective broadcasting. 225 If
Congress desires to add collective licensing to the exemption, it can do
so. Or, as Rep. Waters recently suggested, perhaps Congress should
repeal the NFL's limited antitrust exemption altogether.226 The NFL
would then no longer receive preferential treatment from Congress
and would be on equal footing with any other American business,
where it must seek out deals without running afoul of the Sherman
Act. Without Congressional action, the Seventh Circuit seemingly
legislates from the bench and exempts collective licensing from Sec-
tion One treatment. Its decision substantially differs from that of the
First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, as well as from the Supreme
Court's Board of Regents decision.
CONCLUSION
Sports leagues' collective licensing agencies are agreements be-
tween member teams. Collective licensing agreements concentrate in-
tellectual property in the hands of a single agent. In the NFL's case, it
then exploited the intellectual property rights of all NFL teams to a
single merchandiser, eliminating competition between teams market-
ing their intellectual property and between headwear manufacturers.
Collective licensing harms many of the teams who might ordinarily
sell rights at more lucrative prices than those they receive under the
collective licensing agreement. Additionally, without competitors, a
single merchandiser has no incentive to innovate, so it offers consum-
ers fewer options.
At the very least, courts should be able to review league collective
licensing under the rule of reason. Now that the Supreme Court will
hear American Needle, it can provide guidance to other circuit and
lower courts facing sports leagues' agreements. Each court addressing
the single entity issue in the sports context seems to mention how
223. BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY "expression unius est exclusion alterius" (8th ed. 2004).
224. Id.
225. See SR 1087, supra note 142; see HR 1178, supra note 143. While Congress never con-
templated exempting collective licensing of intellectual property when it passed the Sports
Broadcasting Act, it passed the Act to allow sports leagues to engage in only one form of other-
wise illegal conduct-collective broadcasting.
226. Associated Press, supra note 8.
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tough, difficult, muddy, or confusing the issue is. It is time for the
Court to unmuddy the murky waters. If the Court does grant sports
leagues single entity status, it should carefully review the conduct
under Section Two. Otherwise, sports leagues will be free to act with-
out regard to bedrock antitrust principles. Only Congress should be
able to provide antitrust immunity.
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